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CONTRACTS

thereunder to a warehouseman to produce records of the names of persons

storing goods in the warehouse and the quantities of the goods was held
not to be an unreasonable search under state and federal constitutions2
OLIVER SCHROEDER, JR.

CONTRACTS
EXISTENCE OF CONTRACT FOR PURPOSE OF OBTAINING

MECHANICS' LIEN

Ohio Revised Code section 1311.02 requires the existence of a contract, express or implied, for materials furnished for construction, in order
for a mechanics' lien to arise. In Gebhart v. United States' the Ohio
Supreme Court determined that the transaction involved was a contract
implied in fact, though it superficially resembled an open account between the builder and the materialman, because the supplier had invoiced
each delivery of material to a specific house (of the two being built), and
had listed each house on its books as a separate job.
It is interesting that the case is sharply critical2 of the often quoted
language, "Mechanics' lien statutes create rights in derogation of the
common law and should therefore be strictly construed as to the question

whether a lien attaches, but their procedural and remedial provisions
should be liberally construed, after the lien has been created."' The court
felt that there would be difficulty in determining when the lien was
actually created and what remained to be construed liberally thereafter.
The court then reiterated the statutory rule of liberal construction,4 stating that if strict construction were to be the criterion it should apply "to
protect the right of the lienholder rather than to limit it."5
IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE

In Marshall v. Smith6 the court discussed the factors to be considered
in granting relief because of supervening impossibility of lawful perforxaance. Plaintiff executed a lease by the terms of which he was to use the
premises "in the operation of a tavern business and for no other purpose." 7 Upon the township being voted dry and withdrawal of plaintiff's liquor permit, defendant notified plaintiff of his willingness that the
premises be used for any lawful purpose.
In the declaratory judgment action the court held that in a case involving a lease solely for the transaction of the liquor business the fact
27.

Merchandise Warehouse Co. v. Bowers, 173 N.E.2d 728 (Ohio C.P. 1960).

